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RetuRn MigRation and 
Selective citizenShip
A Study of Returning Chinese Professional 
Migrants from the United States
Lisong liu
In a posting on march 31, 2006, on haiguinet, one of the largest online communities of Chinese returning migrants, a man sought advice on 
whether he should return to China. He had been in the United States 
for ten years and was then working in Silicon Valley. A company at 
the Zhangjiang High-Tech Park in Shanghai offered him an attractive 
managerial position with an annual salary of US$50–63,000 besides other 
benefits (quite high compared to the local salary level). While earning a 
stable yearly income around US$80–90,000 in Silicon Valley, the man found 
his career limited and his life in the United States monotonous.1 Numerous 
comments poured in with advice from both returnees and nonreturnees, 
mostly encouraging him to return to China. One important question raised 
by several respondents, however, was about citizenship. “If you are not an 
American citizen,” one respondent warned, “with that high salary, I guess 
it will be embarrassing after one year, as some Chinese can do the same 
work (with a lower salary). Why just pay you that high? . . . Thus, better 
get American citizenship before returning (so as to be paid differently).”2 
Another respondent added that an American passport would also secure 
his easy return to the United States without worrying about the tedious 
American immigration requirements and paperwork.3 There were also 
notes of caution that with American citizenship, the returnee would face 
many restrictions in living and working in China as a foreigner and might 
even risk deportation if things went wrong.4 
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The active discussion on Haiguinet illustrates both the rising tide 
of Chinese professional migrants (particularly students turned migrants) 
returning to China and the critical role that citizenship status plays in mi-
grants’ plans of returning and in their complex relationships with both the 
homeland and the country of immigration as they navigated in between. The 
return migration of mainland Chinese professionals has gained increas-
ing public attention and has been highlighted in recent years against the 
backdrop of China’s robust economic growth in contrast to the economic 
recession in the United States and around the world.5 Most reports and 
studies have focused on the demographic profiles of returnees, patterns 
of return migration, treatment and adjustment of returnees in China, 
and their contributions to China’s economic, educational, and scientific 
development.6 
Based on a comprehensive ethnographic study of the online Hai-
guinet community and on interviews of returnees,7 this article explores 
returning migrants’ choices and interpretations of citizenship. It revises 
the anthropologist Aihwa Ong’s provocative concept of “flexible citizen-
ship,” which describes the transnational mobility of Hong Kong business 
elites who accumulated multiple passports and embodied the prevalence 
of flexible accumulation and the power of global capitalism.8 In com-
parison, this article proposes the notion of “selective citizenship.” First 
of all, unlike Ong’s study of a small group of “globe-trotting managerial 
elites,” this article looks at ordinary migrants (including middle-class 
professionals) to see how they negotiated complex immigration laws and 
citizenship requirements to gain their transnational mobility in the first 
place. It shows migrants’ careful choice of citizenship based on a histori-
cally formed unequal international system in which different passports 
and citizenship carry different privileges and prestige. Second, while Ong 
shrewdly illustrates Asian corporate elites’ dancing to the tune of global 
capitalism and profiting from flexible and commodified membership, this 
article highlights the varied and nuanced understandings of nationality 
and citizenship among ordinary migrants. For them, nationality is in fact 
questionable for the underlying agenda of nations to claim subjects and 
loyalty. Therefore, selecting or changing nationality is a way for migrants 
to claim their own identity and autonomy.
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The concept of “selective citizenship” also complicates the meanings of 
“dual nationality” and “dual citizenship”9 that have been often celebrated 
as a reflection of eroding national boundaries under globalization and as 
the embodiment of migrants’ transnational or even postnational identi-
ties and rights.10 Discussions on Haiguinet, along with the general debates 
on “dual nationality” in and outside of China, reveal wide variations in 
the attitudes of migrants and returnees toward “dual nationality” based 
on their location, socioeconomic status, and understanding of Chinese 
history and politics. At the same time, a careful study of the origin of 
Chinese nationality laws, the recent development of Chinese green card 
policies, as well as the insistence of the current Chinese government on 
the single-nationality principle, shows that nation-states do not necessar-
ily yield to the popular trend of “dual nationality” but remain proactive 
and selective in refashioning national boundaries. Utilizing the concept 
of “selective citizenship,” this article captures the selective nature on both 
ends of the negotiations between nation-states and migrants. It cautions 
us against a universal and idealized “dual nationality” model and reminds 
us of the importance of full considerations of historical and local contexts.
The Tide of ReTuRn
From 1978 to 2008, China sent 1.39 million students and scholars to study 
abroad, and the majority stayed abroad and adjusted their immigrant 
status.11 However, since the mid-1990s, with China’s remarkable eco-
nomic reform and steady rise on the world stage, increasing numbers of 
Chinese student migrants have returned to China. In 1990, 1,593 students 
returned; the number increased to 5,750 in 1995, 9,121 in 2000, 34,987 in 
2005, and 108,300 in 2009.12 The total number of returned students and 
scholars was more than 632,000 in 2010.13 The return rate of students in 
the United States, which has hosted more than half of Chinese students 
abroad, was estimated at 18.8 percent in the 1980s and 1990s, and the 
American economic recessions in the 2000s have triggered more interest 
among student migrants to return.14 Moreover, a large number of student 
migrants returned without settling down in China as they frequently 
traveled between China and the country of their immigration. A survey 
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conducted in 2000 by China’s Ministry of Education showed that only 44 
percent of 551 returned students who had set up enterprises in thirteen 
industrial parks were living in China on a regular basis.15 Another survey 
in 2008 of 614 returnees from the United States showed that 34 percent 
of them held American green cards or citizenship.16
Returnees have concentrated in major cities like Beijing and Shanghai. 
A survey of 185 returnees in Shanghai in the early 2000s showed that the 
majority were men (81.1 percent) and held master’s or doctoral degrees 
(91.4 percent); the first eight most popular countries where the returnees 
came from were the United States, Japan, Britain, France, Canada, Ger-
many, Australia, and Russia; and 72.4 percent of the returnees had working 
experiences overseas (with an average of 4.36 years, and the longest being 
14 years).17 Most returnees chose to work in business and private-owned 
enterprises or in public enterprises such as universities and research in-
stitutions. A small number of returnees worked in government. A survey 
of returnees in Shenzhen in Guangdong province in 2000 showed that 
returnees in business comprised 61.4 percent, those in public institutions 
27.2 percent, while those in government only 5 percent.18
The tide of return of mainland Chinese professional migrants reflects 
the historical reforms and changes in China, which can be best illustrated 
by two surveys. One was conducted by David Zweig, Cheng Changgui, 
and Rosen Stanley in the early 1990s in the wake of the Tiananmen Square 
Incident, when most Chinese students and scholars on U.S. campuses chose 
to stay abroad considering the unsettling political environment in China 
and better career opportunities in the United States.19 In contrast, the sur-
vey conducted by Vivek Wadhwa and his associates in 2008 demonstrated 
the surging waves of returning Chinese professional migrants and raised 
concerns about the decreasing American competitiveness with the loss of 
these highly educated talents. This survey pointed out the major reasons 
for professional migrants’ return, such as career opportunities, family ties, 
and the quality of life in the homeland.20 My own interviews and study of the 
online returnee community indicate similar reasons, especially returnees’ 
preference for more cultural comfort and better career opportunities back 
in China in comparison with the glass ceiling and cultural alienation in 
the United States. As a returnee in Shanghai noted in his response to the 
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Silicon Valley migrant introduced in the beginning of this article, there 
were significant benefits of returning, such as “a faster career track,” “start 
your own business in the future,” “visibility and view from the top in a 
company,” “higher social status,” “close to family and childhood friends,” 
“more lively and dynamic environment,” and even “find your ideal soul 
mate.”21
Though China’s booming economy and profound social changes have 
provided ample career opportunities for returning migrants, migrants’ 
role in Chinese society and their choice of citizenship seem to be a differ-
ent matter and have been largely shaped by the distinct political and legal 
conditions of mainland China. This can be easily seen by comparing them 
with their Hong Kong and Taiwan counterparts. While many returnees to 
Taiwan have been promoted to the highest government offices (including 
the current president, Ma Yingjiu) and helped establish Taiwan’s high-tech 
parks and design important policies,22 mainland Chinese returnees have 
hardly gained any significant political clout, and returnees often needed 
to avoid politically sensitive issues. The online Haiguinet community, for 
example, had to follow government regulations by self-censoring certain 
words and discussions. With its Internet service station relocated to China 
after 2006 and as one of the few popular websites among Chinese overseas 
that has not been blocked by the Chinese government, this self-censorship 
can be seen as a tactic of the online community for more audience and 
space rather than a surrender of independence. At the same time, Haiguinet 
members often outwitted the government by using alternative expressions 
of sensitive terms, such as replacing “democracy” with “MZ” (the initials 
of the Chinese pinyin of the English word) and the “Tiananmen Square 
Incident” with “Guang*Chang” (the two separated Chinese characters of 
“square”).
Moreover, unlike migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan who can 
possess multiple nationalities, mainland Chinese have to choose one 
nationality because mainland China’s nationality law does not allow dual 
citizenship.23 The lack of flexible citizenship, together with discriminatory 
treatment of different groups in China (including the different treatment 
of mainland Chinese from that of Taiwan and Hong Kong residents), 
deeply frustrated mainland Chinese migrants and returnees and led to 
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their sharp criticisms of the insufficient citizenship rights in China, on 
the one hand, and their careful calculation of the costs and the gains of 
different citizenship, on the other.
Why u.S. CiTizenShip: SeleCTing CiTizenShip undeR an unequal 
inTeRnaTional SySTem
While the British sociologist T. H. Marshall identified citizenship as a 
process of the enlargement of rights in a homogeneous Western society, 
immigration scholars in recent years have increasingly viewed citizenship 
as a social category and a site of negotiation and contestation.24 Immi-
grants’ choice of citizenship, scholars have noted, is often based on their 
cautious consideration of the boundaries citizenship entails and their 
careful calculation of the costs and the benefits of naturalization.25
An important reason for returning Chinese migrants to apply for U.S. 
citizenship is the advantageous position of a U.S. citizen in the global labor 
market. Besides the online advice quoted in the beginning that highlighted 
the necessity of U.S. citizenship to justify a high salary, a more vivid exam-
ple is my interview with a returnee in Shanghai. Zhang returned to China 
in 2001 and worked as a senior manager for an American company in the 
Zhangjiang High-Tech Park. His company had 400 employees; among 
them, about twenty people had U.S. passports, and thirty people had 
overseas experiences without naturalization or had passports of foreign 
countries other than the United States (such as Canada and Australia). As 
Zhang said, for the same position in his company, the salary of the second 
group was about twice that of local people, while the salary for employees 
like him with U.S. citizenship was four times the local package. Zhang told 
the story of a talented Chinese who first worked at the headquarters of 
his company in the United States and then was sent back to China before 
obtaining American immigrant status and citizenship. Soon, the managers 
of the company lowered his salary because they assumed (subconsciously 
and unanimously, as Zhang said) that this man could not easily go back to 
the United States again and therefore was not worth the American-level 
payment. Zhang stressed that in his own case his U.S. citizenship-and his 
family still in the United States—ensured his mobility and helped him 
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bargain for an ideal payment package. He called this a “potential” or a 
“tension” (original English words used by Zhang), which in fact not only 
included advantageous payment but also his “confidence level.”26
Zhang’s case illustrates the role of U.S. citizenship in bargaining for 
privileged economic status or for a so-called expatriate compensation 
package, which is usually far better than local-level payments. Among 
expatriates, those with Western nationalities often dominate the top posi-
tions, and their salary levels are far higher than those of local employees 
or returning Chinese students who have not changed their citizenship. 
According to a survey of expatriates in China conducted in 2005 by the 
Hewitt Associates (now renamed Aon Hewitt), the world’s leading human 
resources outsourcing and consulting services provider, Westerners formed 
the highest percentage of top executives in the survey (54 percent), and 
the highest percentage of expatriates at the managerial level were either 
Westerners (29 percent) or China-hired foreigners (27 percent).27 Another 
study in 2004 showed that while the salary level for senior expatriates 
ranged between US$160,000 and US$320,000, compensation packages for 
China-hired foreigners dropped 20–30 percent below the expatriate pay 
and those for mainland Chinese returnees (most likely without Western 
nationalities) 60 percent below.28 As a result, for many returning Chinese 
migrants from the United States, obtaining U.S. citizenship and retaining 
a base in the United States had played a critical role in getting assigned 
an advantageous compensation package. In fact, as Zhang’s case revealed, 
U.S. citizenship even outplayed other Western nationalities. This attests 
to the varying capitalization of different citizenship in a highly unequal 
international economic order, in which the United States occupies the 
core and U.S. residence and legal status are viewed as the most beneficial, 
as Xiang Biao also illustrates in his study of the global body-shopping of 
Indian IT workers.29 
As professionals who often traveled internationally, returning Chinese 
migrants also valued the advantage of the free access to most countries 
provided by a U.S. passport. Almost all my interviewees in China gave 
the convenience of international travel with a U.S. passport as one of the 
foremost reasons for applying for U.S. citizenship. On Haiguinet in 2006, 
an online member posted an article that had been widely circulated on 
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the Internet. The article listed the numbers of visa-exempt countries for 
different passports. The United States ranked among the top of the eighty-
three countries listed: U.S. citizens could enter about 130 countries or 
territories without the need to apply for an entry visa. In contrast, Chinese 
passport holders could only enjoy this visa-exempt privilege in around 
eighteen countries, better only than passport holders from North Korea, 
Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. The posting immediately aroused 
complaints among Haiguinet members about the difficulties in traveling 
internationally with a Chinese passport.30 While it is hard to trace the origi-
nal source of this passport ranking, a check with official sources confirms 
the remarkable difference. About 130 out of the 200 states listed by the 
U.S. Department of State do not require visas for U.S. citizens traveling for 
tourist or business purposes from thirty days to a few months. As for China, 
while there are sixty-nine countries listed by China’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs that waive the visa requirement for Chinese passport holders, most 
of them apply this privilege only to Chinese diplomats and government 
officials. Twenty-three countries allow Chinese citizens without a visa to 
enter if they hold ordinary passports but visit for state-related businesses. 
Only one state (the Republic of San Marino, a small republic completely 
surrounded by Italy) waives the visa requirement for Chinese citizens with 
ordinary passports regardless of the nature of the visit.31 
The difference in international travel between Chinese and U.S. citi-
zenship (or, more accurately, Chinese and U.S. “passports”) again reveals 
the unequal status of nations in the interlocking international system of 
nation-states. In his discussion of the historical development of pass-
ports, John Torpey argues that the “invention” of the passport illuminates 
the “institutionalization of the idea of the ‘nation-state’ and its efforts of 
regulating people’s movements.”32 Studying the globalization of borders 
spearheaded by the widespread exclusion laws of Asians in the late nine-
teenth century, Adam McKeown further argues that the usage of passports 
and the institutionalization of border control practices embodied the self-
claimed autonomy of nations and constituted the international hierarchy 
of nation-states justified by (and further justifying) the racialization of 
non-Western nations.33 Therefore, the effectiveness of passports is based 
on a historically formed unequal international system in which the European 
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and American states enjoy greater privileges in gaining access to the main 
regions (and resources) of the world. The sharp contrast of the prestige of 
U.S. and Chinese passports cannot be understood without this historical 
background, which continues to impact the contemporary international 
system as well as migrants’ choice of citizenship. 
Returnees also compared social and familial conditions and political 
systems in different national contexts in making their choice of citizenship. 
Many returning migrants based their applications for U.S. citizenship on 
careful considerations of family interests, especially children’s education. In 
a family story told by a man on Haiguinet in 2006, he was offered a posi-
tion in China, but his wife preferred to live in America and have their six-
month-old child educated in the United States. They had had green cards 
for two and a half years, and his wife suggested he wait and get American 
citizenship before returning.34 Concerned with the quality of life and the 
stressful schooling in China, as well as the painful cultural transition of a 
U.S.-born child brought back to China, many returning migrants opted 
for U.S. citizenship to secure family reunion in the United States and to 
keep children there for better educational and career opportunities.
For some returning migrants, U.S. citizenship also served as a shelter 
protecting them from political uncertainties in mainland China. These 
returnees were concerned with China’s problematic legal system and the 
rule of the Chinese Communist Party. Though a significant motivation, 
political protection was not mentioned by returning migrants as frequently 
as the other reasons discussed above since the majority of returnees have 
been pursuing opportunities in economic, social, or cultural fields rather 
than engaging in political activities. 
While U.S. citizenship has been used by returning Chinese migrants 
for economic gains, travel convenience, children’s education, and political 
protection, to list just a few major reasons, obtaining U.S. citizenship is no 
easy work; there is a wait of five years after being granted lawful permanent 
resident status (LPR, or a green card). Applicants must stay in the United 
States for at least half of the five years and should not leave the United 
States for more than half a year at a time. If green card holders leave the 
United States for a trip between six and twelve months, they might break 
or disrupt their “continuous residence” unless providing evidence to 
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prove they continue to “live, work and/or keep ties to the United States.” 
If they leave the country for more than one year, they should apply for a 
Reentry Permit to avoid losing permanent residence.35 For many returning 
migrants, maintaining their green cards and accumulating the required 
time of residence in the United States for future citizenship application 
have been a big challenge (or an “immigration imprisonment,” as dubbed 
by many migrants).
The online Haiguinet community has been a wonderful space for 
returning migrants and potential returnees to share experiences and 
strategies of maintaining immigrant status and transnational mobility. 
Founded in 2003, Haiguinet had a membership of around 30,000 in late 
2006 and more than 74,000 in late 2011. It was founded by returnees in 
business and high-tech industries to exchange information for business 
opportunities. With roaring membership and diverse interests, the returnee 
community developed many subforums such as the Returnees’ Tea House 
(haigui chaguan) to address broader and more practical issues, including 
how to understand citizenship requirements and deal with immigration 
officers, where to live and find friends after returning, how to deal with 
children’s education in China, and how one felt about China’s increasing 
influence in the world. The transnational access of the Internet also enabled 
returnees, potential returnees, and nonreturnees from various countries 
(the United States, Canada, Australia, China, and so on) to gather in this 
virtual community to exchange information and strategies and share 
happiness and sorrows.
In December 2004, an online member forwarded to Haiguinet a docu-
ment of legal advice from an immigration lawyer named Zhang Zherui 
on how to deal with U.S. immigration laws and maintain immigrant 
status. Zhang came to study in the United States in 1985 and then stayed 
and founded his immigration law firm. He provided returnees with sev-
eral suggestions such as paying tax to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 
retaining real estate in the United States, keeping U.S. credit cards and 
driver’s license, and getting certificates of the nature and duration of the 
overseas employment.36
Besides such postings providing formal legal advice, Haiguinet 
members also posted and shared their own strategies. A common strategy 
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recommended is “one family, two systems,” that is, one spouse retaining 
Chinese nationality while the other applies for American citizenship in 
order to secure a base in the United States. While the fact that most main-
land Chinese returnees are men seems to leave women in the passive role 
of waiting for American citizenship in the United States as a backup for 
men’s returning and mobility, it is not simply a “reinvented” patriarchal 
family structure portrayed in Ong’s study of Hong Kong business migrants 
but more resembles what the sociologist Chan Kwok-bun describes as the 
time-honored “family dispersal” strategy of migrants to procure a better 
family future.37 Gender stereotypes still exist, such as returning men be-
ing viewed as more “career-oriented” while staying women are viewed as 
“content with comfortable American life.” However, as many mainland 
Chinese students turned migrant families are formed with spouses both 
highly educated and independent, women are often on an equal footing 
with their male partners in designing career paths and deciding whether 
to return. The “one family, two nationalities” strategy therefore represents 
the active choice of citizenship of migrants, both men and women, to 
circumvent U.S. immigration laws and maximize their family interests 
and transnational mobility. 
There are also tips and suggestions on Haiguinet by returning mi-
grants based on their direct encounters with U.S. immigration officers. 
With no stamp of the exit date by U.S. customs officers, many returnees 
could obscure the exact length of their absence from the United States. On 
Haiguinet, returnees discussed this strategy in direct and indirect ways. 
For example, on October 28, 2003, a returning green card holder asked 
for advice about how often to return to the United States to maintain his 
green card. A respondent replied that one had to stay at least six months 
in the United States each year. The respondent continued: “But you know 
that there is no record when you leave the United States. I am not telling 
you to lie, but you know what I mean.”38 Considering the lack of privacy 
on the Internet, many online members decided to form offline groups and 
discuss strategies with each other via email. While migrants’ negotiations 
with nation-states were not new in history, the Internet and the virtual 
community have provided migrants with new opportunities for sharing 
information and dealing with immigration laws and bureaucrats.
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The pressure on returnees to meet residence requirements and to 
apply for U.S. citizenship highlights the distinction between U.S. lawful 
permanent residents and U.S. citizens. It has been often understood that 
U.S. lawful permanent residents enjoy most of the rights of citizens with 
only a few exceptions, such as the right to vote and to be elected for public 
office. However, such conventional understanding has focused on the rights 
of lawful permanent residents inside the United States, and there has been 
little attention to the fact of migrants’ constantly leaving the United States 
and accordingly to their rights outside the United States. In fact, the differ-
ences between permanent residents (still an “alien”) and citizens become 
more explicit and distinct outside the United States: even the immigrants’ 
right of reentry into the United States becomes vulnerable. In other words, 
while permanent residents to a large degree enjoy benefits similar to those 
of citizens, the boundaries between citizens and permanent residents 
are salient once migrants step outside national territories. This reveals 
the resolution and power of nation-states in reconstructing and claiming 
“citizens-to-be” based on state-designated territories and boundaries, a 
process termed by the anthropologist Donald Nonini as the “localization 
of disciplinary subjects” by nation-states.39 Nation-states have reserved the 
supreme authority to select their subjects and define their rights based on 
an unequal and racialized international system. Ironically, migrants in turn 
selected and used citizenship to outmaneuver and de-localize nation-state 
boundaries and to gain transnational mobility.
It is necessary to note here the difference in the meanings of “naturaliza-
tion” in English and in Chinese. While in English a migrant is to be “natu-
ralized” to become a citizen of the receiving society, the literal translation 
of “naturalization” in Chinese is “guihua,” which keeps the passive tone of 
“being” naturalized or assimilated. However, “guihua” has been seldom used 
by returning Chinese migrants and Chinese migrants in general. The most 
common word used is “ruji,” which literally means “entering the register or 
joining the nationality.” This in fact shows that instead of viewing themselves 
as objects to be “naturalized,” migrants placed themselves as subjects who 
managed the issues of nationality and citizenship.
While “ruji” indicates migrants’ active role in obtaining the citizen-
ship of the receiving society, migrants and returnees have shown strong 
discontent with “automatically” losing their Chinese nationality after 
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obtaining foreign citizenship, as ordained by the Chinese nationality law. 
To fully understand how migrants and returnees calculate the costs and 
the gains of naturalization and select their citizenship, we need to consider 
China’s nationality policies. 
debaTing “dual naTionaliTy” and ReSponSeS To China’S gReen CaRd 
poliCy
The meanings of citizenship and the implementation of citizenship laws 
vary considerably in different national contexts. Studies of citizenship and 
immigration, however, have usually focused on the receiving society and 
neglected the impact of the sending society on migrants’ understanding 
and choice of citizenship. This lack of attention to “emigrant citizenship,” 
as the anthropologist David Fitzgerald suggests, may be caused by the fact 
that “the dominant organs of international academia are located in the 
countries of immigration.”40
However, the trend of “dual citizenship” or “dual nationality” adopted 
or acknowledged by increasing numbers of nations (especially sending 
nations) in the last decades has caught scholars’ attention. While seven 
of seventeen Latin American countries allowed dual citizenship in 1996, 
by 2000 the number had increased to fourteen, and the total number of 
countries in the world allowing dual citizenship directly or indirectly 
by 2000 was about ninety-three.41 The Council of Europe had revised 
the 1963 Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality 
and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, and the 1997 
European Convention on Nationality accepted multiple nationalities 
and recognized the rights of people with dual nationality.42 In Asia, the 
Republic of the Philippines passed a new nationality law in 2003 to recog-
nize dual citizenship, and 3.5 million Philippine emigrants regained their 
Philippine citizenship, which allowed them to vote and even to be elected 
for public office (except those serving in foreign governments or armed 
forces).43 In 2004, a new Indian Nationality Law allowed dual citizenship 
of Indian emigrants in sixteen Western developed nations. In 2005, India 
extended dual citizenship to all Indians who left India after 1950 as long 
as the receiving country also allowed dual citizenship.44 The United States 
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in recent decades has also solidified the right of its nationals to possess 
and retain American citizenship even after obtaining foreign citizenship. 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1967 that de-nationalization must be 
based on voluntary and explicit renunciation of one’s American citizen-
ship, a principle reinforced by Congress in 1986.45 In addition, while not 
encouraging dual nationality, the U.S. government recognizes it exists and 
does not require a person (including immigrants) to choose one citizen-
ship or another.46 
As for Chinese migrants, the dual citizenship issue seems to be more 
complicated. Article 9 of the Chinese nationality law of 1980 provides 
that “any Chinese national who has settled abroad and who has been 
naturalized as a foreign national or has acquired foreign nationality of his 
own free will shall automatically lose Chinese nationality.”47 This “single-
nationality” law frustrates migrants and returnees with many restrictions 
on entering and living in China and has led to vehement discussions of a 
possible change to allowing “dual nationality” of Chinese overseas.
The “dual nationality” question in China in fact should be traced to 
the origin of Chinese nationality laws. The first Chinese nationality law was 
launched in 1909 by the late Qing government for the purpose of retaining 
its Chinese subjects abroad, after it became known that the Dutch were to 
include Chinese in the Dutch East Indies as Dutch subjects. The law was 
based on the principle of jus sanguinis: though conceding that Chinese in 
the Dutch East Indies could become Dutch subjects, the law assured that 
these Dutch subjects were still Chinese subjects whenever they returned 
to China, and that Chinese nationality could be passed on to all persons 
abroad born of Chinese parents.48 This principle of jus sanguinis, or citi-
zenship based on descent or blood, was continued in the nationality laws 
of the Republic of China (first in the mainland and then in Taiwan after 
1949), often leading to “dual nationality” conflicts with other countries.49 
In 1955, to improve diplomatic relations with neighboring states in South-
east Asia that only recently gained independence and worried about the 
allegiance of the large number of ethnic Chinese in their territories, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) signed a treaty with Indonesia, declar-
ing that Chinese could only have one nationality, and overseas Chinese 
should choose either Chinese nationality or the nationality of the residing 
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country.50 After the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the Nationality Law 
of 1980 reaffirmed this single-nationality policy. 
Calls for dual nationality began in the late 1990s. In the second session 
of the Ninth National People’s Political Consultative Conference (NPPCC) 
in 1999, twelve representatives signed and submitted a bill (No. 2172) 
proposing the revocation of the single-nationality law.51 Similar bills (No. 
0222 and No. 0320) were submitted in 2004 in the second session of the 
tenth NPPCC and suggested revising the nationality law so that Chinese 
citizens who had obtained foreign citizenship could decide whether to 
retain or renounce Chinese nationality.52
More appeals came from Chinese abroad. In 2003, an online survey 
was conducted by the Canadian Mandarin Chinese Association and the 
Toronto Information Harbor (duolunduo xinxigang). It took eighteen 
days with the participation of 1,888 Chinese abroad, and 92.6 percent of 
them agreed that the Chinese government should allow dual nationality 
for Chinese migrants in countries that also allow dual nationality. This 
survey was reported to Chen Yujie, director of the Overseas Chinese Af-
fairs Office of the State Council (Guowuyuan qiaoban), when she visited 
Canada in 2003.53 In June 2004, a seminar was held in Paris titled “The 
Twenty-First Century China: Chinese Students Abroad and the Exchanges 
between China and Other Countries.” Representatives of Chinese student 
migrants in Europe met Chinese officials and expressed their support for 
dual nationality of student migrants abroad.54 
While most media reports tended to categorize “new migrants” (xin 
yimin, here referring to post-reform mainland Chinese migrants and 
especially students turned migrants) as one single group advocating and 
embracing dual nationality, there were indeed various views among new 
migrants regarding the desirability and feasibility of dual nationality, 
indicating their diverse understandings of nationality and citizenship 
as well as their distinct class and social status. In April 2008, a Haiguinet 
member posted a survey online to find other members’ attitudes toward 
the dual nationality proposal. Among the sixty-one online members who 
participated, 13 percent voted against the proposal.55 Similar to the dual 
nationality advocates mentioned above, Haiguinet proponents emphasized 
the advantages of dual nationality, such as easy entry to China and less 
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restrictions on housing, employment, and children’s education in China. 
However, many Haiguinet members, including a few senior ones, cautioned 
against the negative side of dual nationality, such as double taxation by the 
United States and China, jurisdictional conflicts, and possible harassment 
by Chinese officials. Opposition to dual nationality also came from some 
returnees who were conscious of their class status and who preferred the 
advantages and benefits a foreign national (particularly an American 
citizen) could enjoy in Chinese society. As an online member remarked, 
“most time I prefer to enjoy the treatment as an American in China.”56
No matter what positions returnees took regarding the dual nationality 
issue, they challenged the Chinese state’s nationality policy or its justifica-
tion for maintaining that policy. For those who supported dual nationality, 
their anxieties and anger about losing their Chinese nationality and the 
resulting inconvenience in returning to and living in China were obvious 
and strong. These proponents questioned the role of the Chinese state 
in “automatically” stripping them of Chinese nationality only because 
they became naturalized in another country, and they frequently cited 
examples of other nations recognizing dual nationality to prove the fault 
and obsoleteness of China’s nationality law.
On the other hand, opponents of the dual nationality proposal were 
not necessarily defending the Chinese government; instead, they doubted 
the Chinese state’s willingness to change the law or to open its gate wider 
to include Chinese overseas with various backgrounds, and they ques-
tioned the desirability of retaining Chinese nationality that would place 
them again under China’s troubling legal and political systems. The most 
vigorous opposition to the dual nationality proposal came from Chinese 
in Southeast Asia and returnees from that region who had experienced the 
ordeal of suspicion and persecution by indigenous Southeast Asian states 
founded after World War II. While they were generally not represented on 
Haiguinet, which is an online space mainly for recent Chinese students 
turned migrants in Western nations, their voices could not be easily 
ignored. In 2005, Zhou Nanjing, professor of Southeast Asian history at 
Peking University, edited a book collecting the different voices about the 
dual nationality proposal, including strong objections from ethnic Chinese 
in Southeast Asia. Himself a returnee from Indonesia in the 1950s, Zhou 
51RetuRn MigRation and SeLective citizenShip        •        liu        •
opposed the proposal, pointed out the fact that the Chinese in Southeast 
Asia were still the majority of Chinese overseas, and reminded readers 
of the persecution the Chinese overseas had suffered historically and the 
very limited support they had received from Chinese governments, which 
always placed migration policies under the needs of foreign relations. Zhou 
sharply criticized a senior Chinese official for silencing different opinions 
and promoting dual nationality without thinking responsibly about the 
interests of the majority of the Chinese overseas.57 
Debating the gains and the risks of dual nationality and frequently 
referring to citizenship laws in other nations, Haiguinet discussions often 
led to sharp criticisms of the insufficient citizenship rights in China and 
raised enlightening suggestions regarding China’s political and social 
reforms. In December 2008, an online member who had naturalized 
abroad raised a provocative question: as the Republic of China (ROC) 
in Taiwan recognizes dual nationality and constitutionally claims itself 
as the government of all Chinese (including all Chinese overseas), why 
should mainland Chinese migrants not apply for a ROC passport? The 
purpose is to apply to the mainland Chinese government for a “Certificate 
of Fellow Chinese from Taiwan” (Taibao zheng), as this certificate would 
provide what mainland Chinese abroad most cherish: “the convenience 
and freedom of entering and leaving one’s homeland.” According to this 
migrant, this action might even contribute to the reunification of Taiwan 
and mainland China. Moreover, it would pressure the mainland Chinese 
government to address its unequal treatment of citizens of Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and the mainland. While Hong Kong residents could retain their 
Chinese nationality after acquiring another country’s citizenship, why 
shouldn’t mainland Chinese migrants enjoy the same right even though 
they had lived in and paid direct taxes to mainland China? Mainland 
Chinese had been treated by their own government as “second or third 
class citizens,” the author protested.58
The Chinese government’s responses to the dual nationality proposal 
have been ambiguous, precarious, and often conflicted. As new migrants 
(especially students turned professional migrants) have been viewed as a 
most important group with the technology and capital needed for China’s 
development, government leaders have shown interest in their concerns, 
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and there have been reported attempts to adopt the dual nationality 
proposal.59 However, the official position has persisted, and national in-
terests have retained “resilient supremacy.”60 In 1999, the bill (No. 2172) 
submitted by the twelve committee members of NPPCC was forwarded 
to the Ministry of Public Safety (Gonganbu), which responded by stat-
ing that the nationality law had been based on historical wisdom dealing 
with China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries and “still applies to 
China’s current situation and suits fundamental national interests.”61 More 
recent reports cited Chinese officials who announced that China would 
maintain the single-nationality policy, though more flexible policies on 
Chinese overseas’ visiting and staying in China would be considered.62
As the historian Philip Kuhn noted, Chinese migration policies have 
historically swung between national security and economic interests.63 
The current Chinese policies on nationality and migration echo such a 
historical pattern with contemporary characteristics. The Chinese state 
always turns to national security when designing its nationality laws and 
migration policies, placing the former as the first priority. National se-
curity concerns involve two aspects: international position and domestic 
stability. The PRC government diverted from the dual nationality policy 
of the late Qing and then the Republican governments and changed to 
the single-nationality law in 1955 with the primary purpose of building 
relationships with neighboring states and ensuring China’s security in 
the Cold War. International relations and geopolitical considerations 
therefore have been the priority in constructing China’s nationality laws 
and continue to be so. On the one hand, the majority of Chinese overseas 
are still in Southeast Asia (more than 29 million in 2009, or 75 percent of 
the total population of Chinese overseas),64 where the “loyalty question” 
has always been a sensitive issue. On the other hand, with the increasing 
economic, political, and military power of China, “China threat” senti-
ments have been on the rise.65 A profound change of China’s nationality 
law would have easily contributed to such sentiments and would be viewed 
by the Chinese government as detrimental to China’s national security. 
The Chinese government might also have based its nationality law on 
its concerns about domestic stability. Emigration was often prohibited, and 
Chinese abroad were viewed as “traitors” and foreign agents by China’s late 
imperial dynasties.66 Though the Qing government in its last decades and 
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the following Chinese states (Republican governments and the early PRC 
government) had generally embraced migrants as contributors or patriots, 
the images of “traitor” and “threat” lingered in the minds of China’s rulers 
and became dramatized in turbulent times such as the Cultural Revolution 
when returnees and any ties with Chinese abroad were viewed as vicious 
and dangerous. Though currently the Chinese government again identi-
fies Chinese abroad mainly as contributors, it remains concerned about 
infiltration and subversion. For those who retain Chinese nationality and 
are viewed as detrimental to national security, the Chinese government 
prevents their reentry to China by denying the renewal of their passports.67 
The weight of national security can also be seen in the recently increas-
ing control of traditional media and the Internet, a step to reinforce the 
virtual national boundaries and to safeguard domestic Chinese’ ties and 
exchanges with the outside world.68 
With consolidated borders, the Chinese government has also paid 
more attention to attracting highly skilled and wealthy Chinese migrants 
for China’s economic and technological development. New policies were 
launched in a few big cities first. In November 2001, proposals for Chinese 
“green cards” were discussed in a meeting of the Ministry of Public Safety. 
Soon after large cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou launched 
policies granting long-term residence permits to foreign talents. On August 
15, 2004, with approval from the State Council, the Minister of Public 
Safety and the Minister of Foreign Affairs cosigned the “Policy regarding 
the Approval and Management of Foreigners Residing Permanently in 
China,” or the so-called Chinese green card policy. 
These new policies about foreigners’ visiting and staying in China had 
developed in the early 2000s along with China’s increasing integration into 
the world, such as its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001 and the then-expected Beijing Olympics in 2008. Chinese media 
hailed these new policies as symbols of China’s growing openness to the 
world and as opportunities to enhance China’s confidence as a “big power,” 
and foreigners granted Chinese green cards were expected to be pioneers 
in the “internationalization of Chinese people and Sinicization of people 
around the world” (Zhongguo ren guoji hua, shijie ren Zhongguo hua).69 
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However, these Chinese green card policies do not offer foreign na-
tionals permanent residence but instead just the permit to live one to five 
years with the convenience of “one visa, multiple entries.” The qualification 
requirements for green card applications are also very high, thus setting 
new boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. The 2002 Shanghai policy of 
granting foreigners long-term residence, for example, was a point system 
with detailed preferences based on age, education, profession, employment 
title, work schedule, the amount of investment, and the applicants’ family 
situation. It ranked on the top the applicants between twenty-five and fifty-
five years old, possessing Ph.D. degrees, with expertise in the fields deemed 
as most desirable by the government (such as information technology and 
biological pharmacy), with senior positions in internationally renowned 
institutions in the past, applying for full-time work in Shanghai, serving 
as principal directors or managers in major state-sponsored projects or 
in corporations with an investment of US$50 million or more in China, 
and with family members who were also highly skilled professionals. The 
maximum points would qualify the applicant for a five-year residence 
permit.70 The 2004 green card policy further formalized the three categories 
of desired applicants: investors with an investment of at least US$500,000 
in China, extraordinarily talented professionals, and immediate family 
members of Chinese citizens or permanent residents. As a result, there 
were 1,460 applications submitted in the first three years after the policy 
started, and less than half (686) were accepted.71
Returnees and potential returnees have been largely dismayed by the 
symbolic Chinese green card policy. In late 2004, a Haiguinet member 
posted a Chinese official’s statement of possible adjustment of the nation-
ality law to recruit “excellent overseas talents.” The immediate response 
questioned: “But what is their definition of ‘talent’? Prominent? Affluent? 
Or rich and famous?”72 The report of the official’s statement was posted 
on Haiguinet again in January 2006, and respondents again found the 
official’s use of “talent” problematic. One commentator asked: “Who said 
that everyone is equal before law?”73 Adding to this criticism, another 
commentator pointed out that U.S. immigrant visas were also granted 
to preferred groups, and the United States did not want ordinary people 
either. “It is the same everywhere,” the commentator sighed.74 
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Disappointment with the green card policy again led returnees and 
migrants to challenge the insufficient citizenship rights in China. Zhang 
Daqin came to study in the United States and then stayed and became an 
immigration lawyer. A licensed lawyer in both the United States and China, 
he is a member of the legal consultant committee of the Entrepreneurs 
Association (qiyejia xiehui) at Guangdong Province and has written ex-
tensively for Chinese legal journals, newspapers, and popular websites. In 
an essay forwarded to Haiguinet in 2006, Zhang noted that some Chinese 
had complained that Chinese green cards offered more rights to foreign-
ers than to Chinese citizens and that foreigners enjoyed an “ultra-citizen 
treatment” (chao guomin daiyu) in China, such as no restrictions on house 
registration or residence location. Indeed, Zhang argued, “it is not that we 
give too many rights to foreigners but that we give too little rights to our 
own citizens.” As he wrote, “the household registration system (hukou), the 
pass to border cities (bianjing zheng), discriminations based on origin, and 
the gap between cities and the countryside have let hundreds of millions 
of citizens fall to the status of strangers in their own land.” With the new 
green card policy, Zhang hoped, “China could also import more ideas of 
human rights and humanitarianism, and the ruling class should be mod-
est in exerting power and should treat Chinese citizens with dignity.”75
The land, The CulTuRe . . . noT The papeR: flexible naTionaliTy and 
SeleCTive idenTiTy 
Besides careful calculations of the gains and risks of different citizenship 
and vigorous negotiations with both U.S. and Chinese immigration and 
nationality laws for transnational mobility, “selective citizenship” for 
migrants and returnees also means the flexibility in changing nationality, 
on the one hand, and the capability and resilience in selecting one’s own 
identity, on the other. The decoupling of individual-oriented identity 
from state-designated nationality and loyalty is the key to understanding 
migrants’ identities.76
For many migrants and returnees, nationality is a simple product 
of the political world in which one is to be registered and administered 
(guanxia), and it is not identical with their personal identity and cultural 
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belonging. For example, a Haiguinet member noted, “I only care about 
what I am, and it does not matter in which administrative district I live.”77 
This administrative unit could refer to either the United States or China, 
though many migrants particularly refuted the idea of retaining Chinese 
nationality to prove their cultural identity. For them, the Chinese nation-
ality is mainly a tool of the Chinese state in administering the popula-
tion, similar to the notorious house registration system (hukou). They 
also showed strong discontent with the government indoctrination they 
received in their education in China that their nationality be completely 
identical with personal identity. As one active female Haiguinet member 
pointed out, “I have been taught since primary school to believe that our 
motherland is identical with my own mom, but I have always been doubt-
ful about that equation.”78 
Therefore, for migrants and returnees, losing Chinese nationality does 
not mean losing their Chinese culture or Chineseness, and being natural-
ized as an American citizen and staying in the United States does not mean 
they are to be Americanized. Similarly, one does not need to stick to Chinese 
culture if one is more attracted to American culture, and one has the right 
to select his or her own identity. In February 2009, a Haiguinet posting 
attracted heated discussions of the meanings of nationality and national-
ity change.79 The author came to the United States more than ten years 
ago but had not changed nationality for the fear of becoming no longer a 
Chinese. Immediate responses challenged this link between nationality and 
identity. “No matter which nationality you acquire, you can always claim 
yourself as a Chinese. China refers to the land, the people, not the state,” 
a senior member wrote. Noting the facts that there were many dynasties 
and states in Chinese history and that the current Chinese state is only 
temporarily administering the land, this respondent argued that there was 
no need to care about the title of the state (guohao) and that the only need 
was to identify with the land.80 Another senior member asserted that the 
issue of nationality was all about convenience, and “the true identification 
is in fact based on the native language and family affections, and we don’t 
pledge loyalty to a paper.” Citing the impact of the 2008 global financial 
crisis on foreign employees in the United States, this member suggested 
that holding what passport depend on which society was the primary place 
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of employment, considering the different treatment between green card 
holders and citizens.81 
There were also strong voices against changing nationality only for 
convenience, and they presented nationality as a legal obligation and moral 
responsibility. Disagreeing with the statement of one of the most senior 
online members (the so-called headmaster of the online community, a 
well-known Chicago-based male financier frequently returning to China) 
that “a passport is only a travel document,” a discussant reminded him 
of the oath of allegiance one needed to give during the U.S. naturaliza-
tion ceremony.82 Pasting the complete oath statement (in both English 
and Chinese), the “headmaster” emphasized his identification with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States and his wholehearted dedi-
cation to defending them. Responding to another discussant’s question 
about which side he would support in case of war between China and the 
United States, the “headmaster” replied that he would be against any war.83 
Another respondent then added: 
If China invaded the United States, I would fight for the United States, 
as here are my home and my ideals; if the United States invaded China, 
I would fight for China, as my hometown, my relatives, and my culture 
are there. If there were a war between a third country and the United 
States, I would flip a coin (to decide which side to support), just kidding, 
I am definitely against war.84 
Such debates, common among returnees and migrants and often without 
a consensus, revealed the complex meanings of citizenship and national-
ity and the critical reflections of migrants and returnees on their own 
identities. The emphasis on the moral responsibility of naturalization 
and the criticism of pragmatic nationality change were in fact more about 
reaffirming personal choices (with the resulting responsibility and the 
expected active civic participation) rather than confirming the uncondi-
tional allegiance of individuals to the nation of immigration. The ques-
tion of naturalization became an issue of loyalty to one’s ideals of justice 
and freedom rather than an issue of blind allegiance to one specific state. 
Personal and cultural identities were also viewed as an issue of individual 
choice rather than as primordial with no possibility of change. Following 
the above discussions of passports as travel documents or as responsibili-
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ties, another regular online member emphasized that individual choices 
of identity should be respected and tolerated. If a mainland Chinese im-
migrated and naturalized as an American citizen and viewed himself as 
an American instead of a Chinese, it most likely meant he identified with 
American history, culture, and system, and had accordingly given up those 
things he had learned in mainland China. This was “an individual choice 
doing no harm to others” and was just fine, he asserted.85 
Migrants’ and returnees’ understandings of nationality and personal 
identity have been further complicated by the surging power of China in 
recent years, revealing the intricate implications of China’s rise for Chinese 
abroad. To a large degree Haiguinet discussions of identity echoed and 
continued the discussions in the early 1990s, as epitomized in the influ-
ential anthology The Living Tree, which looked at the exodus of Chinese 
intellectuals after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident and redefined the 
meanings of Chineseness not within China but in the “peripheral” and 
more diverse and dynamic Chinese communities abroad.86 Many of the 
active Haiguinet members in fact have been known as participants in the 
democratic movements in the 1980s. Then how would they respond to 
China’s development and increasing power and identify themselves in this 
new historical context? 
On the last day of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the founder of Haiguinet 
posted a passionate note, arguing that though China might now have be-
come a nation strong in sports, politics, and economy, it is still far from a 
strong nation based on civic values (wenmin daguo). He maintained that 
China needs to be more open to learn from other nations and to develop 
political democracy and economic freedom.87 The many postings that 
followed generally presented two opinions: China does need to strive for 
more reforms as contemporary prosperity and progress have been based 
on high ecological and social costs and have concealed serious problems; 
or China’s progress does constitute a sort of “Chinese model” that chal-
lenges the Western model based on liberalism and democracy. Again 
without reaching a consensus, the heated debates highlighted the serious 
concerns of migrants and returnees about the nature of China’s rising 
power and accordingly the meanings of being a Chinese. As the founder 
keenly pointed out, to see whether one really identifies with a country 
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(even with a strong China now) one can see how one “votes with feet,” 
as many Chinese still prefer to come to the United States.88 Echoing the 
founder’s sentiments and reaffirming China’s need for more opening and 
reforms, a respondent applied the same need to Western nations: “Only by 
opening to other countries can the United States/Britain/Germany have a 
future, only by humbly learning from all other countries and cultures can 
the United States/Britain/Germany make achievements, only by respecting 
others and following basic values and ethics of human civilization can 
one be respected by others.”89
Remaining critical about both the homeland and the country of im-
migration, migrants and returnees selected useful parts of both cultures 
to construct a new culture and a new identity for themselves. A returnee 
I interviewed in Shanghai obtained his Ph.D. in the United States, acquired 
U.S. citizenship, and then returned to Shanghai and founded his own com-
pany. As he stated,
We [Chinese students turned migrants] have our own and independent 
perspective, which is not the same as that of Americans, nor the same 
as that of the Chinese. . . . [We] comprise a unique group with our 
educational background and social status. What we learned in the later 
stage of our formative years (i.e., the time of studying and living in the 
United States), such as democracy and freedom, are close to Western 
culture, while our understanding of peoplehood, religion, and belief 
are profoundly influenced by Chinese culture. Therefore, we have a 
unique way of thinking, a combination of the strength of both the East 
and the West.90 
The selective approach of Chinese migrants and returnees in constructing 
their identities echoes the hybrid and “translated” identity of international 
migrants discussed by the political scientist Thomas Faist. Faist argues that 
migrants are “continually engaged in translating languages, culture, norms, 
and social and symbolic ties.”91 As Peter Kivisto further elaborates on this 
“translated” identity, “transnational migrants forge their sense of identity 
and their community, not out of a loss or mere replication, but as some-
thing that is at once new and familiar—a bricolage constructed of cultural 
elements from both the homeland and the receiving nation.”92
Faist draws a corresponding model between migrants’ different 
types of adaptation, their different identities, and the different types of 
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citizenship: assimilation corresponds to a unitary national citizenship, 
ethnic pluralism corresponds to multicultural citizenship, while syncretist 
cultural practices and translated identities correspond to transnational or 
dual citizenship.93 Similarly, many scholars have welcomed dual citizen-
ship and even postnational citizenship and viewed them as promising 
manifestations of the fading national boundaries under globalization and 
as effective tools to uphold migrants’ own cultural identity and to enlarge 
migrants’ rights beyond national contexts.94 For example, Stephen Castles 
and Alastair Davidson argue that “in view of the mobility intrinsic in mo-
dernity and globalism,” “a notion of porous borders is required . . . such a 
system would break with the outmoded norm of singular membership in 
a nation-state and recognize the growing prevalence of dual or multiple 
membership.”95 In a more cautious review of the prospects and risks of dual 
nationality, David Martin concludes that “the status of dual nationality 
should be explicitly accepted,” and “it usually reflects the reality of complex 
loyalties and allegiances in an increasingly interconnected world, marked 
by a growing circle of democratic states with converging interests.”96 
The case of Chinese migrants and returnees cautions us about the 
universal applicability of dual nationality. First of all, the immigration 
and nationality laws based on the transformed rather than eroding na-
tional boundaries, together with the different privileges and prestige of 
nationalities entrenched in the historically formed international hierarchy 
of nation-states, led migrants to be highly selective in choosing national-
ity and citizenship. Second, there is no definite correlation between dual 
citizenship and translated identity. In other words, a hybrid and translated 
identity does not need to be embodied in or guaranteed by dual citizenship. 
Migrants and returnees construct their hybrid identities while remaining 
flexible and selective with nationality and citizenship in order to maximize 
their transnational mobility and individual autonomy. Moreover, dual 
nationality does not necessarily work in the best interests of all migrants, 
and migrants’ attitudes toward dual nationality have been far from uni-
fied but instead widely varied. There are new migrants who feel uneasy 
about the overhanging Chinese state power that would accompany the 
dual nationality status, and the long-established Chinese communities in 
Southeast Asia have remained highly alert and strongly opposed to dual 
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nationality based on their past and present experiences under the shadow 
of the pernicious “loyalty question.”
This article examines the various factors that shaped returning mi-
grants’ choices and interpretations of citizenship. It highlights migrants’ 
“selective citizenship”: while nation-states have often selected migrants 
and citizens, as immigration scholars have underscored,97 migrants have 
also actively chosen nation-states and citizenship, though their choices 
have to be based on existing immigration and nationality laws and on 
the historically formed international hierarchy of nation-states in which 
different nationalities and passports carry different privileges and prestige. 
Illustrating the selective nature of both migrants and nation-states, “selective 
citizenship” shows that multiple nationality or citizenship is neither desired 
by and suitable to all migrants nor embraced and practiced by all nation-
states. The dual nationality issue is destined to be a contested terrain with 
different groups and institutions negotiating their interests in a complex 
power structure, and it has to be discussed in historical and local contexts. 
“Selective citizenship” also symbolizes migrants’ determination to 
detach individual and cultural identities from state-designated national-
ity and loyalty. The dual nationality debates lacked consensus precisely 
because, for migrants, nationality and citizenship were selectable, and there 
should be no single interpretation of nationality and identity imposed by 
nation-states or charted by nationality laws. The shrewdness of migrants 
in distancing themselves from state-claimed loyalty and their emphasis on 
their own choices and lives are common and comparable among different 
national and ethnic groups. For example, the Mexican population in the 
United States responded with “minimal interest” in submitting paperwork 
to (re)gain Mexican nationality offered by the Mexican government in 
1998.98 For most ordinary migrants and returnees, it is better to remain 
cautious about states’ agenda, and nationality and citizenship are sites of 
negotiation and tools for the fulfillment of their own dreams. 
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